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One of the main comments on the signalling inventory model (Hughes & Schwartz, 1988) was the 
absence of a comparison between FIFO and other possible signalling devices. In this paper the 
model  of Hughes  &  Schwartz  (1988)  is  extended  by  adding  a  second  accounting  signal:  the 
depreciation accounting method. 
If the manager-owner can choose between FIFO and liilear depreciation to  solve asymmetries in 
information about the success of the project, he will always choose the signal, which results in the 
smallest increase in taxes paid. Therefore, the characteristics of the investment and the purchasing 
policy are very important. In capital intensive industries,  where investments in  fixed assets  are 
large, FIFO is expected to be the cheapest signal. As the volatility of prices and the inventory level 
go up, FIFO becomes more expensive as a signalling device. 
Differences in the cost from using a certain signalling strategy can explaiil why differences in 
reporting strategies between industries occur. 




1.  Introduction 
In literature it is shown that accounting choices can solve asymmetries in information between the 
investors and the firm about the expected market value. The auditor's choice (Titman & Trueman, 
1988;  Feltham,  Hughes  &  Simunic,  1990;  Datar,  Feltham  &  Hughes,  1991),  the  auditor's 
replacement (Dye,  1991), the inventory accounting method (Hughes and Schwartz,  1988)  or the 
expected cash flow levels (Hughes,  1986) can fulfil a signalling function about the value of the 
project.  In all  these  models,  firms  with  a  high  expected  market  value  choose  an  unexpected 
accounting method or financial policy: FIFO, a high quality auditor or a high level of debt in order 
to reveal their private information. 
The problem with most signalling models is that the signalling device is given in advance: it is the 
dividend level, the manager's ownership, the inventory method. In reality, the manager can choose 
between all these possible information suppliers.  In the  literature,  the efficiency  of accounting 
signals is not extensively discussed. Datar, Feltham and Hughes (1991) investigated the choice of 
the auditor and the retained ownership together. Part of the asymmetries in information is solved 
by the  auditor's  choice and the rest  by  the  management's  ownership.  The  introduction  of two 
signals results in a lower signalling cost and a larger utility for the manager. While they made a 
comparison between a financial and an accounting signal, two accounting signals are compared in 
this paper. Because one of the main comments on the Hughes and Schwartz model (1988) was the 
lack  of comparison  of FIFO  with  other  signals,  in  this  paper  the  inventory  method  and  the 
depreciation method are chosen as possible accounting signals. 
I build a model, where asymmetries in information about the level of fixed costs exist, high or low 
fixed costs. Both types of firms sell a homogeneous product and they play Coumot competition in 
the first stage of the game. Given the value maximising output, the successful firm with low costs 
determines the signalling device to reveal the firm type:  linear depreciation or FIFO. The main 
conclusion of the  paper is  that economic determinants  influence the choice between FIFO  and 3 
linear deprecation as  a signalling device. The level of investment and inventory, the depreciation 
rate and the volatility of prices playa part. Large investments in fixed assets and a high rate of 
accelerated depreciation create a large difference between the linear and accelerated depreciation 
amounts  and a large increase in the taxes paid from using linear depreciation. Therefore, firms 
with high investment rates often prefer FIFO to  reveal the firm type.  Moreover, FIFO becomes 
more attractive as a signalling device when the volatility of prices and the inventory level are low. 
The paper is organised as follows. The assumptions of the model and the sequence of the game are 
clarified in section 2. The choice between FIFO and linear depreciation is dealt with in section 3. 
Finally, some concluding remarks are made in section 4. 
2.  The model : assumptions and sequence of the game 
I assume a duopoly: two firms compete with each other in the product as well as in the competitive 
market of equity. The two firms sell a homogeneous product 1 and they only differ  in the amount 
of fixed  costs:  FCR  or  FCL.  The  successful  firm  faces  smaller fixed  costs  (FCR)  than  the 
unsuccessful firms  (FCL)  (FCR < FCL ). Therefore, the successful firm (R) realises  higher cash 
flows than the unsuccessful firm (L). The success of the firm is private information only known by 
the manager of the firm, the type of the firm t is an element of T =  {R, L}. 
Both types buy the  good they sell in the product market at  a price P,  this  price has  a uniform 
distribution between P  min  and P  max  . At the start of the project the manager-owner buys x products 
at an initial price PI. The price of the goods sold Po is determined by the quantity sold by the firm 
itself and the competitor. I assume that the price of the goods sold equals: 
Po = a - b(qLj + qRj) 
P: the price of the goods sold; 
b: a fixed parameter, that expresses the degree of price elasticity; 
qtj: the quantity sold by a Hype firm in period j. 
I assume a two period model, where in the first period the number of products bought equals the 
number of goods sold, while in the second period the number of goods sold minus the initial level 
of inventory x are bought and the inventory at the end of the project equals zero 2. 4 
Both types of firms have to invest K$ in fixed assets because the manager-owner wants to start a 
company. The manager-owner sells a part of the totally owned company to raise K$; al  is the part 
of the shares sold 3. 
Given these assumptions in the first stage of  the game both firms playa Cournot game. Without 
considering the reporting strategies and the related tax consequences, each type determines the 
value maximising output in the first as well as in the second period 4  • 







+ E( qt2(a - b( qL2 + qH2»  - P(qt2 - X) - Fkt)/(l +ii 
the expected value of a Hype firm at time zero; 
the price of the goods bought; 
the quantity sold by at-type in period j; 
the initial price of the purchases; 
the initial amount of goods bought; 
the amount of investment; 
Because both types face the same marginal costs, the value maximising output is the same for both 
types in both periods and it equals (a-P)/3b. As the input price P increases, the marginal cost of 
selling one unit goes up and the value maximising output decreases. As the elasticity of the output 
prices goes up, the marginal revenue of selling one unit and the value maximising output decrease. 
Given this value maximising output (a-P)/3b, in the second stage of  the game both types determine 
an inventory and a depreciation method for tax and reporting purposes. The same method must be 
used for reporting and tax purposes. The depreciation method is d and d is an element of D =  {a, 
s},  which  is  restricted  to  either  linear  depreciation  (s  = 112  in  both  periods)  or  accelerated 
depreciation  (a >  112  and  a  is  the  depreciation  rate  in  the  first  period  and  (1  - a)  is  the 
depreciation rate in the second period). 
The manager of the firm also determines an inventory policy choice v and v is an element of V = 
{FIFO, LIFO}. If LIFO is chosen, the expected cost of the goods sold equals E( (P(a-P)/3b) in the 
first period and E(P((a-P)/3b - x»+ PI x in the second period. If  FIFO is used the cost of the goods 
sold equals E(p((a-P)/3b - x»+ PI x in the first period and (P(a-P)/3b) in the second period. 5 
In  a complete information environment the manager will choose the reporting strategies, which 
minimise the taxes paid. I assume a concave and increasing tax rate environment, where tax(Xtdvj) = 




the maximal tax rate M; 
the slope of the tax rate; 
profits of a q-type firm in period j using the depreciation method d and 
the inventory method v; 
the exponential function e. 
In this environment four reporting strategies are possible: {s, FIFO}, {s, LIFO}, {a, FIFO} or {a, 
LIFO}. The manager will certainly choose these reporting strategies, which maximise his income 
over the total life of the project: 
Max  aNo (t, d, v)-K + (1-al)V2 (t, d, v)/(1+i)2 
The manager receives an income at the start of the project by selling al of the shares. The price is 
determined by the beliefs of the investors. At the end of the project he receives his part of the cash 
flows  realised. The cash flows  realised at the end of the first period are invested in a risk free 
asset, the interest rate received after taxes is i and the income from investments in risk free assets 
is taxed separately at a fixed tax rate t. 
Given these assumptions the sequence of the game is designed in Figure  1. 
Insert Here Figure 1 
Figure 1: The sequence of the game when the manager determines the quantity sold, the inventory 
and the depreciation method 
1. Nature determines the level of fixed costs; 
2. The manager observes the type of the firm and he determines the value maximising output 
qHor qL; 
3.  Given  this  value  maximising  output,  the  manager  determines  the  reporting  strategy 
{  a,LIFO}, {a,FIFO}, {s,LIFO}, {s, FIFO}; 
4.  Investors observe the inventory and the depreciation method and given their beliefs they 
offer a price for the shares sold: aNo (q,  d,  v).  This price is determined by the reporting 
strategies because they determine the taxes paid; 
5.  The manager chooses the highest price offer and his  income over the total life of the 
project equals: . aN  0 (q, d, v) - K + (1- al)V  2  (q, d, v)/(1 +i)2 6 
3.  Results 
In a complete infonnation environment, if profit levels are sufficiently high and the initial price of 
the goods bought PI is small, both types prefer {a, LIFO} to reduce the taxes paid. If {a, LIFO} is 
the  best choice in a complete infonnation environment,  the choice  {a, LIFO}  must result in a 
larger income than the other possible paths {s, LIFO}, {s, FIFO} and {a, FIFO}. 
or 
al Va(t, a,LIFO) -K + (I-ar) V2 (t, a, LIFO)/(I+i)2 > al Va(t, a,FIFO) -K + (I-ar) V2 (t, a, FlFO)/(I+i)2(1) 
al Va(t, a,LIFO) -K + (I-at) V2 (t, a, LIFO)/(I+i)2 > al  Va(t, s,FIFO) -K +  (I-aI)V2 (t, s, FIFO)/(I+i)2(2) 
al Va(t, a,LIFO) -K + (I-aI) V2 (t, a, LIFO)/(l  +i)2 > al Va(t, s,LIFO) -K + (I-ar )V2 (t, s, LIFO)/(I+i)2(3) 
Whether {a, LIFO} is the value maximising choice depends on the level of cash flows, the amount 
of investment and the initial price of the goods bought (Proof see appendix proposition 1). If  the 
price of the initial purchases and the amount of investment are large, {s, FIFO} can be the value 
maximising choice. In this case, these two reporting methods can never fulfil a signalling role. 
In an  incomplete infonnation  environment investors  do  not know  the  type  of the  finn.  If no 
information is supplied, all types are valued at the same price, which is  disadvantageous for the 
successful project H. The manager of the finn with low costs can reveal its private infonnation by 
the choice of a reporting strategy. If the accounting choice  {a, LIFO}  is the value maximising 
choice, the manager can reveal its type by one of the following strategies: {a, FIFO}, {s, FIFO} or 
{s,  LIFO}.  Because  a  duopoly  situation  exists  with  two  types  of firms  and  two  accounting 
methods,  the  manager can choose between different signalling  strategies  and the efficiency of 
signals can be considered 5. First, I discuss which strategy can be a signal of a successful project 
H,  that means  low fixed  costs.  Afterwards,  I  compare  these  strategies  and  I  investigate under 
which circumstances a certain strategy will be preferred. 
Because {a, LIFO}  is the value maximising choice for both types, the manager of the successful 
project can not separate from the unsuccessful finn by choosing this strategy. If he chooses this 7 
strategy, the manager of the unsuccessful firm will always imitate the successful firm because he 
does not have to  pay additional taxes by choosing a non-value maximising method  {ex,  FIFO}  or 
{s, LIFO}. Moreover, a larger price for the shares sold at the start of the project would be received 
because the firm is identified as a successful firm. 
If the manager chooses a signalling device not only {ex, LIFO} but also {s, FIFO} will not be used 
to reveal the firm type. This choice is not efficient because only two different types occur and the 
manager  only  possesses  private information  about one  unknown  parameter:  the  level  of fixed 
costs. If the manager chooses {ex, FIFO} or {s, LIFO}, it is an unexpected behaviour and investors 
will identify the  firms  using one  of those  strategies  as  a successful  firm.  The asymmetries  in 
information are solved but the manager must face an increase in taxes paid. If  the manager chooses 
{s, FIFO}, no new information is supplied but more taxes must be paid and the manager's income 
decreases. Therefore, a manager who maximises his utility, will never choose {s, FIFO} to reveal 
the firm type when asymmetries in information about one unknown parameter and two different 
types of firms exist. He prefers either {  ex, FIFO} or {s, LIFO} to solve asymmetries in information. 
Proposition  : If  the  difference  is  larger between the accelerated and the linear depreciation 
amounts than between the expected costs of  the goods sold using LIFO and FIFO, the manager 
of the  successful firm  will prefer {a,  FIFO}  above  {s,  LIFO}  to  reveal  the positive  inside 
information, low flXed costs. 
Before comparing  {ex,  FIFO}  and  {s,  LIFO}  the reliability  of each signalling strategy must be 
investigated. 
If  the inventory method is chosen as  a signalling device, only  {ex,  FIFO}  can be a signal of high 
cash flows  but this  strategy can only occur as  an equilibrium strategy when the manager of the 
successful  project  can  realise  an  increase  in  income  compared  to  {ex,  LIFO}.  Moreover,  the 
manager of the unsuccessful project may not have an incentive to imitate. In other words, he must 8 
realise the largest income by choosing {a, LIFO}. Revealing the firm's type is advantageous for 
the successful firm when : 
ai Va(R, a, FIFO) -K + (I-aI) V2 (R, a, FIFO)/(I+i)2 
>  ai  Va(L, a, LIFO) -K + (I-aI)  V2 (R, a, FIFO)/(I+i)2  (4) 
The manager of the unsuccessful firm realises the largest income by choosing {a, LIFO} when: 
(I-a  1) Va (L, a, LIFO) -K + a1  V  2 (L, a, LIFO)/(I  +i)2 
> (l-al) Va(R, a, FIFO) -K + a1  V2 (L, a, FIFO)/(1+i)2  (5) 
If  th~  two conditions are fulfilled,  {a, FIFO}  is  a reliable signal of a successful project, low 
fixed costs. 
An efficiency problem only occurs when the manager can also choose another signalling device to 
reveal the private information: {s, LIFO}. As for {a, FIFO} the manager of the successful project 
is only prepared to use {s, LIFO}  when the higher price received for the shares sold is larger than 
the decrease in income at the end of the project because additional taxes must be paid by using 
linear depreciation or: 
al Va(R, s, LIFO) -K + (l-aI)V2 (R, s, LIFO)l(I+i)2 
> al Va(L, a, LIFO) -K+ (I-aI) V2 (R, a, LIFO)/(l+i)2  (6) 
The manager of the unsuccessful project must realise the largest income by choosing {a, LIFO} or: 
al Va(R, s, LIFO) -K + (I-a1) V2 (L, s, LIFO)/(I+i)2 
< al Va(L, a, LIFO) -K + (I-a1 )V2 (L, a, LIFO)/(I+i)2  (7) 
If the signalling conditions (4) up to  (7) are fulfilled, an efficiency problem occurs: the manager 
can choose between {s,  LIFO}  and  {a, FIFO}  to  solve asymmetries in information. An efficient 
signal is a signal, which results in the largest increase in income from identification as a successful 
project with low fixed costs. As  shown, both strategies result in an increase in the price received 
for the shares at the start of the project but more taxes must be paid at the end of the project. To 9 
know which strategy {s,  LIFO}  or {a, FIFO}  will be chosen, the net revenue of both strategies 
must be determined and compared. The difference between the signalling revenue, the higher price 
received for the shares at the start of the project, and the signalling cost, the lower income at the 
end of the project, is the net revenue from using a certain strategy. 
The increase in income for the manager of a H-firm from using {a, FIFO} can be determined from 
condition (4) and it equals: 
al (Vo (R, ex, FIFO) -yo (L, ex, LIFO)) - (l-al)(V2 (R, ex, LIFO) - V2 (R, ex, FIFO))/(1+i)2  (8) 
If the manager of the H-firm uses {s, LIFO}, the  increase in income can be determined from 
condition (6) and it equals: 
al (Vo (R, s, LIFO) -Yo (L, ex, LIFO)) - (1-al)(V2 (R, ex, LIFO) - V2 (R,s, LIFO))/(1+i)2  (9) 
The manager of the successful project will use the signalling device, which results in the largest 
increase in income over the total life of the project. The manager prefers the strategy {a, FIFO} 
above {s, LIFO}  when (9) is smaller than (8), the additional taxes paid are smaller using the first 
strategy or : 
(V2(R, ex, LIFO) -V2 (R, s, LIFO))/(1+i)2 >  (V2 (R, ex,LIFO) - V2 (R, ex, FIFO))/(1+i)2  (10) 
I show in Figure 2 under which circumstances this condition can met. 
Insert Here Figure 2 
Figure 2: The effect of the chosen accounting methods on the change of the tax rate in the first and 
second period 
If the manager uses the value maximising strategy {a, LIFO}, XHaLIFOI  is the level of profits and the 
taxes paid are minimised in the first period. Whatever strategy is used as  a signalling device, {s, 
LIFO} as well as  {a, FIFO} result in an increase in profits in the first period (XHaLIFOI < XHaFIFOI < 
XHsLIFOI). In Figure 2,  the increase in profits is  larger using {s,  LIFO}  than  {a, FIFO}  (XHsLIFOI> 
XHaFIFOI) because the difference between the depreciation amounts is larger than between the costs 
of the goods sold (aK- Kl2 > E(P - Pdx). In this case, in the first period the increase in the tax rate 10 
(  ~  llinear >  ~  lFIFO) and in the taxes paid is larger using {s, LIFO} than {a, FIFO}. Figure 2 shows 
not only the effect in the first but also in the second period. Compared to {a,LIFO}, {a, FIFO} as 
well as  {s, LIFO}  result in smaller profits  (XHsLIF02 < XH"FIF02 < XH"LIF02)  and a smaller amount of 
taxes paid. Because the total amount of write-offs is the same over the total life of the project and 
more costs are expensed in the first period using {a, FIFO} than {s, LIFO}, the costs expensed in 
the second period are smaller using the first strategy and the profits realised are larger. Because the 
profit level is smaller using {s, LIFO} than {a, FIFO}, the decrease in tax rate is larger using {s, 
LIFO} than {a, FIFO}  (~2linear > ~2FIFO). The concave and increasing tax rate function and the time 
value of money are the reasons why the advantage of {s, LIFO} in the second period can never be 
larger than the advantage in the first period  (~2linear - ~2FIFO  <  ~llinear - ~IFIFO). If  the difference is 
larger between the depreciation amounts  than between the cost amounts  of the goods sold,  the 
increase in the tax rate and the taxes paid is larger using {s, LIFO} than {a, FIFO}. In Appendix 
proposition 2 this statement is proven. 
In conclusion, the choice of a signalling device depends on the relationship between the level of 
profits. If  the difference is larger between the depreciation amounts than between the cost amounts 
of the  goods sold,  {s,  LIFO}  results in a larger increase in taxes  paid and the manager -owner 
benefits from the largest increase in income by choosing {a, FIFO} as a signalling strategy. 
Whether  this  situation  occurs  certainly  depends  on  the  characteristics  of the  investment  and 
purchasing policy. As the investment amount goes up, the difference between the accelerated and 
linear depreciation amount increases and  the additional taxes  paid from using {s,  LIFO}  grow. 
Therefore, I expect that in capital intensive industries, where investments are large, {a, FIFO} is a 
less expensive signalling device (The proof is made in Appendix proposition 3). 
The  legal  environment  also  influences  the  choice  of a  signalling  device.  As  the  accelerated 
depreciation  rate  increases,  the  firm  can  realise  larger  tax  savings  from  using  accelerated 11 
depreciation and linear depreciation becomes a more expensive signalling device. Therefore, in 
countries, where the accelerated depreciation rate is high, the choice of {s, LIFO} is less likely to 
be  chosen  as  a  signalling  device  (The  proof  can  be  found  in  Appendix  proposition  4).  In 
conclusion,  as  the investment amount and the accelerated depreciation rate increase,  {s,  FIFO} 
becomes a more expensive signalling device. 
However, the characteristics of the purchasing policy may not be ignored in choosing {s, LIFO} or 
{a, FIFO}.  As  the  initial price drops,  an  increase in  the  price becomes  more  likely,  and the 
expected cost difference between {a, FIFO}  and  {a, LIFO}  as  well as  the increase in the taxes 
paid  from  using  {a, FIFO}  go  up.  Therefore,  as  PI  decreases,  {a,  FIFO}  becomes  a  more 
expensive signalling device. In industries where the current price of the purchases is low and the 
volatility of prices is  high,  the chance is  larger that {s,  LIFO}  is  chosen as  a signalling device. 
Moreover, as the firm invests more in an initial level of inventory, this effect is strengthened (The 
proof is made in Appendix proposition 4 and 5). 
4.  Conclusion 
In this  paper  a  comparison  is  made  between  two  accounting  signals:  the  inventory  and  the 
depreciation accounting method. The model of Hughes and Schwartz (1988) is enriched by adding 
Cournot competition and by introducing a second signal the depreciation accounting method. The 
main conclusion is that FIFO will not always be hold as a signalling strategy to reveal the positive 
inside information. 
I investigate the signalling problem in  an  environment, where two firms,  one with high and one 
with low fixed costs, compete in  the product as  well as  in the financial  market. In the product 
market both types  sell a homogeneous  product and they play Cournot competition. Because the 
product is homogenous and the marginal cost of the goods sold is the same for both types, neither 





in the signalling model, the quantity as well as the price of the good sold as the cash flows realised 
are endogenised, what does not occur in the model of Hughes and Schwartz (1988). 
Given the value maximising quantities, the manager-owner determines the signalling device: FIFO 
or linear depreciation. The manager-owner of the firm with low costs has an incentive to reveal its 
success because he sells a part of his shares and he can receive a higher price for the shares sold if 
the asymmetries in information are solved. 
I  assume  an  environment  where  the  manager-owner  can  choose  between  two  depreciation 
accounting  methods,  linear or accelerated depreciation,  and  two  inventory  methods,  FIFO  and 
LIFO. In a complete information environment an income maximising manager-owner will always 
choose  accelerated  depreciation  and  LIFO  to  minimise  the  taxes  paid.  In  an  incomplete 
information environment and a duopoly situation the other three strategies can be used to solve 
asymmetries in information. However, linear depreciation and FIFO are certainly not an efficient 
choice because asymmetries in information about only one parameter, the expected cash flows and 
a duopoly situation with two types of firms exist. The addition of a second unexpected accounting 
signal does not offer any new information while the manager must pay additional taxes. Therefore, 
in  a  duopoly  situation  the  manager  chooses  either (linear depreciation,  LIFO)  or (accelerated 
depreciation, FIFO) in order to reveal the firm type. 
I show that industry  characteristics playa major part in  choosing one of these  strategies.  The 
manager-owner of the firm will always choose the signal, which results in the smallest increase in 
taxes paid and the largest increase in income. In industries where the volatility of prices is high, 
the  chance of an  increase  in  price  and  in  taxes  paid from using  FIFO  is  large.  Therefore,  in 
industries  with  a  high  volatility  of the  input prices,  I  expect  that  FIFO  is  not  preferred  as  a 
signalling device. 13 
However,  the  characteristics  of the  investment policy  may  not  be ignored.  As  the  investment 
amount goes up,  the increase in profits from using linear depreciation as  well as  the increase in 
taxes paid grow. Therefore, I expect that in capital intensive industries, accelerated depreciation 
and FIFO are used as  reporting methods because the cost from using linear depreciation is  too 
high. 
The analysis of the difference in costs between these strategies also shows that legislation has a 
major influence. As  the allowed accelerated depreciation rate drops, the difference between the 
depreciation amounts as  well as the additional taxes from using linear depreciation decrease and 
linear depreciation becomes more attractive as a signalling device. However, legislation also limits 
signalling by the choice of accounting methods. The choice of FIFO and linear depreciation is only 
a  reliable  signal  when  the  same  method  must be used for  tax  and  reporting  purposes. If the 
d<;:preciation rate could be determined freely, the firm with low costs could probably reveal its type 
by the value maximising depreciation rate. Because signalling by the depreciation rate is free,  it 
would certainly preferred as a signalling device. The characteristics of the legal environment also 
explain why the inventory and the depreciation accounting method together are unable to  reduce 
the  signalling  cost.  Contrary  to  the  study  of Datar,  Feltham  and  Hughes  (1991)  either  the 
depreciation method or the inventory method is used as a signalling device. 
This  signalling model illustrates  why  differences across  industries  in reporting strategies  could 
occur  (Watts  &  Zimmerman,  1990).  However,  signalling  by  an  income  increasing  reporting 
strategy remains an expensive signalling device, it always results in an increase in the taxes paid 
because legislation only offers the discrete choice between two  alternatives. The main challange 
for the future is to compare these two accounting methods as a signalling device and to introduce 
more industry related characteristics in empirical studies. 14 
APPENDIX 
Proposition  1:  If  cash flows  are  sufficiently large  and PI  is  small,  {a,  LIFO}  is  the  value 
maximising choice in a complete information environment. 
The expected taxes if the depreciation method d and the inventory method v is used, equal: 
J 
(Xtdvl ( M- e-C(Xldvl) ) 
+ 
(1 +i) 
If Xtdv! is larger than lIc the taxes paid are an increasing function of the profits realised. Therefore, 
the taxes paid are certainly larger using {s, LIFO} than {ex, LIFO}. Moreover, if PI  is smaller than 
E(P), the expected profits and the taxes paid are larger using {ex, FIFO} than {ex, LIFO}. Finally, if 
PI  is smaller than E(P), the expected profits and the taxes paid are certainly larger using {s, FIFO} 
than {ex, LIFO}. 
Proposition 2: If  the difference is larger between the linear and accelerated depreciation amounts 
than between the LIFO and FIFO cost of  the goods sold,  {a,  FIFO} is a less expensive signalling 
device than {s,  LIFO}. 
When the characteristics of the tax rate environment, the investment and purchasing policy are 
filled in condition (10), the increase in taxes paid is larger using {s, LIFO} than {ex, FIFO} when: 
M(exK - Kl2)  (  _1_  _  _1_  J _ ( _1_ 
(1+i)  (1+i)2  (1+i) 
(XHaFIFOl + lIc) e-C(XHaFlFO I)  (XHsLIFOl + lIc) e-C(XHsLlFO I) 
(Pmax - Pmin) c(2(a-P)/9b - x )(1+i)  (Pmax - Pmin) c(2(a-P)/9b )(1 +i) 






(P  max-Pmin)c(2(a-P)/9b)(1 +i)  (P  max-Pmin)c(2(a-P)/9b -x))(1 +i)2 
The first two terms show the difference in expected taxes paid between {ex, FIFO} and {s, LIFO} 
when  the maximal tax  rate  M  is  applied. If the difference  between the  accelerated  and linear 15 
depreciation amount «a -1I2)K)  is  larger than the expected cost difference between LIFO and 
FIFO «P  max + P  rnin)/2  -PI X),  the increase in profits and additional taxes  paid is  larger using {s, 
LIFO}  than  {a, FIFO}.  However,  the  tax  rate  is  smaller than  the  maximal  tax  rate  M.  The 
difference in additional cash flows realised between {s, LIFO} and {a, FIFO} because the tax rate 
is smaller than M, occurs in the third term for the first period and in the fourth term for the second 
period. If  the difference between the depreciation amounts is larger than between the costs of the 
goods  sold,  the  increase in  profits is  larger using {s,  LIFO}  than using  {a, FIFO},  XH"FIFOI  is 
smaller than XHsLIFOl.In this case, the advantage of a tax rate different from M is larger using (a, 
FIFO)  than using (s,  LIFO) because (x  tdvj  + lIe) e'cx tdvj  is  a convex decreasing function of the 
profits for all values of Xtdvj  7. The profits in the second period are larger using {a, FIFO} than 
using Is, LIFO}  (XH"FIF02  > XHsLIF02). Therefore, the additional cash flows because the tax rate is 
smaller than M are larger using {s, LIFO} than {a, FIFO}, and {s, LIFO} creates an advantage in 
the second period. However, this advantage is  smaller than the disadvantage of {s, FIFO}  is  the 
first period because (Xtdvj+ lIe  )e-CXtdvj  is a convex decreasing function of the profits Xtdvj. Therefore, 
the sum of the exponential terms is positive. Because the difference between the first two terms is 
also positive, the additional taxes paid are certainly larger using {s, LIFO} than {a, FIFO}. 
In conclusion, the strategy {s, LIFO} is a more expensive signalling device than {a, FIFO} when 
the difference between the depreciation amounts is larger than the difference between the expected 
cost of the goods sold using LIFO and FIFO. 
Proposition 3: If  K increases, {s,  LIFO} becomes a more expensive signalling device 
The first order derivative of the cost difference between {s, LIFO} and {a, FIFO} to Kin 
proposition 2 equals: 
M(a - 1/2) 
(1 ~i)2 J 16 
a(XHaFIFOI) e-C(XHaFlFO 1)  1I2(XHsLIFOl) e-b(XHsLIFOI) 
(Pmax -Pmin) c(2(a-P)/9b - x )(l+i)  (Pmax -Pmin) c2(a-P)/9b(1+i) 
(l-a) (xHaFIF02) e-C (XHaLIF02)  1/2 (xHsLIF02) e-C (XHaFIF02)  J  P  max 
(Pmax -Pmin) c(2(a-P)/9b - x) (1+1)2  Pmin 
+ 
(Pmax -Pmin) c2(a-P)9b (1+i)2 
Because Xtdvj e -\dvj is a convex decreasing function for values of x larger than 2/c and at (c(2(a-
P)/9b-x))  >  0,51  (c(2(a-P)/9b-x))  >  0,51  (c(2(a-P)/9b))  >  (l-a)/(c(2(a-P)/9b)),  the  difference 
between the exponential  terms  is  certainly  larger in  the  first  than  in  the  second  period. If K 
increases, the decrease in taxes paid is  larger using {a, FIFO}  than  {s,  LIFO}  and  {s,  LIFO} 
becomes less attractive as a signalling device. However, if profits are smaller than 2/c and larger 
than  llc, the time value of monp.y  determines whether {s,  LIFO}  becomes more attractive as  a 
signalling device. Finally, if profits are smaller than llc, {s, LIFO}  becomes a cheaper signalling 
device. If a firm reports a loss, an increase in the investment amount results in a larger loss, no 
additional  tax  savings  can  be  realised  by  using  accelerated  depreciation  and  accelerated 
depreciation becomes less attractive as a signalling device. 
Proposition 4: If  a  increases, {s,  LIFO} becomes a more expensive signalling device 
The first order derivative of the cost difference in proposition 2 to a equals: 
MK 
(1  ~i)2 J 
+cK 
[(  xHaFJF01)  e~(""'''o  ,) 
(Pmax-Pmin) c(2(a-P)/9b -x)(l+i)  (Pmax-Pmin) c(2(a-P)/9b - x) (1+i)2  J
Pmax 
Pmin 
Because Xqdvj  e-cx qdvj is a concave or convex decreasing function for values larger than lIc, XHaFIF02 
is  larger than  XHaFIFOI  , {s,  LIFO}  becomes a more expensive signalling device. The strategy  {s, 
LIFO} becomes more attractive as a signalling device for profits smaller than lIc. If firms realise 17 
negative profits, no taxes must be paid and an increase in the depreciation amounts does not result 
in an decrease of the taxes paid. 
Proposition 5: If  PI  decreases, {s,  LIFO} becomes more attractive as a signalling device. 
The first  order derivative  of the  cost difference  between  {s,  LIFO}  and  {ex,  FIFO}  to  PI  in 
proposition 2 equals : 
+  cx  (
(XHaFIFOl) e-C(XHaFIFO 1) 
(Pmax-Pmin) c(2(a-P)/9b -x)(l+i) +  (Pmax-Pmin) c(2(a-P)/9b - x) (1+i)2  J
Pmax 
Pmin 
Because only positive terms occur,  {ex,  FIFO}  certainly becomes less expensive as  a  signalling 
device when PI grows. However, if the initial price drops {s, LIFO} becomes more attractive as a 
signalling device. 
Proposition 6: If  x increases, {a, FIFO} becomes less attractive as a signalling device. 
The first  order derivative  of the  cost difference  between  {s,  LIFO}  and  {ex,  FIFO}  to  x  in 
proposition 2 equals : 
-M((P  max + P  min)/2- Pr)  (  1 
(l+i) 
+  (
-C(P-PI)(XHaFIFOl ) e-C(XHaFlFO 1) 
(Pmax-Pmin) c(2(a-P)/9b -x)(l+i) + 
C(P-PI)(XHsLIF02) e-C (XHsLIF02) 
(Pmax-Pmin) c(2(a-P)/9b - X)  (1+i)2  J
Pmax 
Pmin 
Because XH"FIFOI  is smaller than XHsLIF0l2  and Xqdvje-CXqdvj  is a decreasing function of the profits for 
values larger than  lIe, the first order derivative is  certainly negative. As the initial inventory x 
increases,  the  additional  taxes  paid  by using FIFO  increase  and  {ex,  FIFO}  becomes  a  more 
expensive signalling device. REFERENCES 
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Because a homogeneous product is assumed, Bertrand competition is impossible. 
The inventory at the end of the project must equal zero to consider all tax effects. 
The part of the shares sold is exogeneously determined, otherwise it can also fulfill a signalling 
function. 
The value maximising output is determined before taxes because otherwise the chosen depreciation 
and inventory method would determine the quantity sold. 
If more than two types exists, (s, FIFO) can also occur as an equilibrium strategy. 
XH"FIFOl= (a_p)2 /9b + (P-Pr)x- Fkh - a K 
XHsLIFOl =  (a_p)2 /9b - Fkh - Kl2 
XH"FIF02= (a_p)2 /9b - Fkh -(I-a) K 
XH"LIF02= (a_p)2 /9b + (P-Pr)x- Fkh- Kl2 
This effect is strenghtened by the smaller constant term, which is smaller using (a, FIFO) than using 
(s, LIFO)«c 2(a-P)/9b-x) -x) < c2(a-P)/9b». 